Toleration, Value-pluralism, and the Fact of Pluralism
Title:
Toleration, Value-pluralism, and the Fact of Pluralism
Author:
Jones, Peter
Appeared in:
Critical review of international social and political philosophy
Paging:
Volume 9 (2006) nr. 2 pages 189-210
Year:
2006-06-01
Contents:
This essay examines Gray's value-pluralism in relation to the fact of pluralism - the fact that people are committed to different and conflicting beliefs, values and ways of life. More particularly, it examines whether, given the fact of pluralism, Gray's value-pluralism can deliver the mutual toleration that is necessary if people are to commit to the modus vivendi he seeks. I consider that issue in two parts: first, by examining whether value-pluralism argues for toleration amongst value-pluralists themselves; secondly, by considering whether the value-pluralist can cope with those who do not share his conception of value. The essay concludes by suggesting that, even though Gray rejects a conception of the right that is independent of the good, it is a conception he may need.
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